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ABSTRACT
In September 2014, Alibaba Group Holding Limited (Alibaba)
successfully launched a $25 billion initial public offering (IPO), the largest
IPO ever, on New York Stock Exchange. Alibaba’s IPO success witnessed a
wave among Chinese Internet companies to raise capital in U.S capital
markets. A significant number of these companies have employed a novel, but
poorly understood corporate ownership and control mechanism—the
variable interest entity (VIE) structure and/or the disproportional control
structure. The VIE structure was created in response to the Chinese
restriction on foreign investments; however, it carries the risk of being
declared illegal under Chinese law. The disproportional control structure,
usually in the form of dual-class shares, helps founders or controlling
shareholders maintain control post-IPO with less equity contribution.
Around 30 percent of U.S.-listed Chinese companies adopted a dual-class
share structure or similar mechanism to enhance insider control. This
percentage is much higher than that of U.S. public companies, which is only
about 6 percent.
This Article uses Alibaba as a case study to analyze the legal challenges
posed by the VIE and disproportional control structures. Specifically, it
dissects the structure of the VIE and sheds important light on inherent legal
and governance risks associated with the VIE structure, along with potential
policy solutions to protect investors and reduce information asymmetry.
Similar to most U.S. high-tech companies that adopt dual-class share
structures to maintain control by founders, Alibaba grants a partnership,
consisting of its founders and executives, an exclusive right to nominate a
majority of its directors. Furthermore, Alibaba implements various antitakeover measures to strengthen insider control, many of which are
considered detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders. Such
excessive insider control presents a puzzle as to the success of the world’s
largest IPO and casts doubt on the long-debated issue of whether corporate
governance truly matters. In this Article, we argue that the idiosyncratic
value brought by a charismatic founder-executive—in this case, Alibaba’s
Jack Ma—together with voluntary commitments made by Ma himself in
Alibaba’s prospectus, help mitigate the potential abuse inherent in
disproportional insider control structures. However, the success of such a
structure hinges on the reputation and commitments of specific founders and
may not function to the benefit of all investors in the long run.
INTRODUCTION
When Alibaba Group Holding Limited (Alibaba) listed its shares on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in September 2014, it generated
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considerable market buzz.1 In addition to garnering the largest initial public
offering (IPO) of all time, China’s largest e-retailer employed a novel and
poorly understood corporate ownership and control mechanism—combining
the variable interest entity (VIE) with a disproportional control structure.2
VIEs involve a complex set of financial arrangements that enable foreign
investors to circumvent the Chinese regulatory restrictions on foreign
investment in Chinese Internet companies. 3 Buyers of stock in a VIEstructured company do not actually own the underlying business.4 Rather,
they own rights to the revenues of the operating company through a series of
contracts between the operating company and an offshore shell company.5
Of the two hundred Chinese companies listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ,
ninety-five employ the VIE structure. 6 The VIE structure enables
international investors to access a sector of the Chinese economy that would
otherwise be off-limits to foreign ownership due to China’s foreign
investment restrictions.
In addition to the VIE ownership structure, Alibaba employs another
unique disproportional corporate control mechanism—an insider partnership.
This insider partnership, formally registered as Lakeside Partners L.P., but
more commonly known as the Alibaba Partnership (the Alibaba Partnership
or Partnership), consists of a group of founders and insider executives.
Alibaba’s Articles of Association grant the Alibaba Partnership exclusive
rights to nominate a simple majority of Alibaba’s board members, no matter
how many shares the Alibaba Partnership holds. 7 While the Alibaba
Partnership consists of top executives who run the Alibaba Group, the two
key founders of Alibaba (i.e., Jack Ma and Joe Tsai) ultimately control the
Partnership. 8 Such a control-enhancing mechanism deviates from the
1. Laura Lorenzetti, Who Needs Alibaba? IPO Market Chalks Up a Strong Quarter, FORTUNE
(Sept. 30, 2014, 2:06 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/09/30/who-needs-alibaba-ipo-market-chalksup-a-strong-quarter/.
2. Liyan Chen, Ryan Mac & Brian Solomon, Alibaba Claims Title for Largest Global IPO
Ever with Its Extra Share Sales, FORBES (Sept. 22, 2014, 11:51 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2014/09/22/alibaba-claims-title-for-largest-global-ipo-everwith-extra-share-sales/#c9afbaa7c26d.
3. DAVID ROBERTS & THOMAS HALL, VIE STRUCTURES IN CHINA: WHAT YOU NEED TO
KNOW, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP RESEARCH REPORT: TOPICS IN CHINESE LAW 1, 4 (2011) (on
file with the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law).
4. Kenneth Kan, Alibaba and the Variable Interest Entity, THE MKT. MOGUL (2014),
http://themarketmogul.com/alibaba-and-the-variable-interest-entity/.
5. Id.
6. Matt Schiavenza, VIEs: The Quirky Little Structure Helping in the IPO, INT’L BUS. TIMES
(Sept. 17, 2014, 8:34 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/alibaba-ipo-vies-quirky-little-structurehelping-ipo-1690160.
7. See Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., Amended and Restated Articles of Association 20 (2013)
[hereinafter Alibaba Articles of Association], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1577552/0
00119312514333674/d709111dex32.htm.
8. See, e.g., Heather Timmons, Don’t Let Alibaba’s 27 Partners Fool You—The Company is
Controlled by Five People, QUARTZ (June 26, 2014), http://qz.com/226541/dont-let-alibabas-27partners-fool-you-the-company-is-controlled-by-5-people/.
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traditional “one share, one vote” principle of shareholders’ voting rights and
completely separates shareholders’ equity stake from corporate control.9 The
Partnership’s exclusive nominating power also has an effect similar to that of
dual-class shares—the most common disproportional control measure
adopted by U.S. public companies.10 Like the Alibaba Partnership, dual-class
shares allow founders to control a majority of the board election votes, while
holding a relatively small portion of economic rights. 11 In addition to
disproportional control over the board, Alibaba has adopted several antitakeover measures to protect it from the risks of change in corporate control.12
In general, about 6 percent of U.S. public companies have dual- or
multiple-class shares, “comprising around 8 percent of the market
capitalization of all firms.”13 However, this number has increased drastically
over the past decade, as U.S. technology companies and U.S.-listed Chinese
firms have more widely adopted dual-class share structures. To be exact, 29
percent of U.S.-listed Chinese firms, which represent 70 percent of the
market capitalization of all U.S.-listed Chinese firms, employ dual-class
share structures. 14 The growing popularity of this ownership-control
structure among U.S. public companies is worth serious research efforts to
assess its impact on corporate governance and shareholder protection.
While VIE and disproportional control structures are employed by a
substantial portion of U.S.-listed Chinese firms, they carry several important
hidden risks regarding corporate governance and control. Given the present
legal uncertainty surrounding the VIE structure, what would happen if VIEs
become illegal under Chinese law? Furthermore, given that investors do not
own shares in the actual Alibaba operating company due to Alibaba’s VIE
structure, what are the implications of this arrangement on Alibaba’s
corporate governance? How can Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC)
rules—which were designed for a very different type of corporate ownership
structure—be strengthened to deal with VIEs? What are the impacts of
disproportional insider control and anti-takeover measures on corporate
governance and investor protection? Given the complexities of both the VIE
9. Simon C.Y. Wong, Rethinking “One Share, One Vote”, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 29, 2013),
https://hbr.org/2013/01/rethinking-one-share-one-vote.
10. Dual-Class Share Structures: The Cost of Control, THE ECONOMIST (July 21, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/18988938.
11. Matt Orsagh, Dual Class Shares: From Google to Alibaba, Is it a Troubling Trend for
Investors?, CFA INST.: MKT. INTEGRITY INSIGHTS (Apr. 1, 2014), https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/mar
ketintegrity/2014/04/01/dual-class-shares-from-google-to-alibaba-is-it-a-troubling-trend-for-invest
ors/.
12. Reynolds Holding, Anti-Takeover Measures Often Hurt Investors, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
(Dec. 17, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/anti-takeover-defense-measures-oftenhurt-investors/?_r=0.
13. Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of DualClass Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1053 (2010).
14. H.K. STOCK EXCHS. & CLEARING LTD., CONCEPT PAPER: WEIGHTED VOTING RIGHTS 8
(2014), http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/mktconsul/Documents/cp2014082.pdf.
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and control-enhancing mechanisms, do U.S. investors have sufficient legal
tools to protect themselves from possible expropriation by controllers?
Aside from the various governance concerns, this Article also intends to
explore the positive aspects of the disproportional control structure in light
of Alibaba’s successful IPO. In theory, there are two competing hypotheses
regarding the effect of the disproportional control structure on firm value.
First, the “entrenchment hypothesis” focuses on the agency costs incurred by
control-enhancing mechanisms and argues that this entrenched governance
design is value destroying for shareholders. Second, the “long-term value
creation hypothesis,” argues that, by protecting managers from hostile
takeovers, an insider-dominated governance structure helps managers pursue
long-term investments and create long-term shareholder value. Based on an
analysis of the characteristics of key founders and relevant commitments
made by Alibaba’s founders in the company’s prospectus, this Article finds
that key founders create significant value for investors when they choose not
to accrue excessive private benefits arising from their disproportional control.
Furthermore, this Article argues that these voluntary commitments, in
conjunction with the founders’ reputations and the high growth potential of
the Chinese Internet industry, make Alibaba’s IPO a great success, despite
the risks associated with its VIE structure and the Alibaba Partnership’s
disproportional control.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the background of
Alibaba’s public listing on the NYSE. Part II examines the history and
structure of the VIE, including its status under the laws of the People’s
Republic of China (China). This Part will also look at various types of risk
that VIEs pose for investors. Part III investigates the structure and
composition of the Partnership as well as anti-takeover provisions adopted
by Alibaba and their impact on corporate governance. Drawing on existing
corporate control literature and empirical evidence from the Alibaba IPO,
Part IV provides possible explanations for the popularity of Alibaba’s
securities listing, despite serious concerns over its corporate governance. Part
V offers policy recommendations to mitigate the risks associated with the
VIE and disproportional control structures. The final Part concludes.
I. BACKGROUND
Alibaba’s listing on the NYSE was not its first bite at the public listing
apple. Alibaba previously sought to list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange
(SEHK) with a dual-class share structure. 15 However, the SEHK rebuffed
Alibaba on the grounds that its dual-class share structure violated the SEHK’s
“one shareholder, one vote” rule.16 As a compromise, during its negotiations
15. Shei Wei & Angus Young, Dual Share Plan in Context: Making Sense of Hong Kong’s
Decision Not to Embrace Alibaba’s Listing, 26 INT’L CO. & COM. L. REV. 4, 4 (2015).
16. Id.
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with Hong Kong authorities, Alibaba proposed to form a “partnership”
consisting of twenty of the company’s leading executives—led by founder
Jack Ma—that would nominate the majority of the company’s directors.17
The proposed structure was akin to those of U.S. technology companies, such
as Facebook and Google, whose founders exercise considerable control.18 An
Alibaba spokeswoman touted the partnership structure as “open, innovative,
responsible and [a] sustainable system for a company’s fundamental
needs.”19
Nonetheless, Hong Kong authorities rejected the dual-class share
structure proposed by Alibaba. 20 The loss of Alibaba cost the SEHK an
estimated $200 million HKD, which could have added 2 to 3 percent to the
exchange’s 2013 revenues.21 Upon having its partnership proposal rejected
by Hong Kong regulators, Alibaba turned to the NYSE, which agreed to its
partnership proposal.22 The NYSE’s approval of Alibaba’s proposal allowed
Alibaba to move forward with its plans and leave corporate control firmly in
the hands of the Partnership.
Control-enhancing mechanisms include: (1) granting a certain person an
exclusive right to nominate directors and (2) dual-class share structures.
Under existing U.S. listing rules, shareholders have the power to appoint and
dispose of directors. 23 Since 1986, however, the NYSE has allowed dualclass share structures, which grant certain classes of shares disproportional
voting rights in relation to their economic rights. 24 Alibaba’s partnership
control structure resembles the dual-class share structure in that it both allows
disproportional corporate control and deviates from the “one share, one vote”
principle. The NYSE is open to such deviations as long as the company
makes sufficient disclosures regarding its corporate structure.
On September 22, 2014, Alibaba filed a prospectus with the SEC
pursuant to section 424(b)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act. 25 The
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Matthew Yglesias, All Hail, Emperor Zuckerberg, SLATE (Feb. 3, 2012, 3:29 PM),

http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2012/02/facebook_s_ipo_how_mark_zuckerber
g_plans_to_retain_dictatorial_control_his_company_.html; Walter Frick, How Google Changed
Management, 10 Years After its IPO, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 20, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/08
/how-google-has-changed-management-10-years-after-its-ipo/; About Google: Company, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/about/company/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
19. Charlotte So, U.S. Bourses Accept Board Plan, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 21,
2013, 10:02 AM), http://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/1336259/us-bourses-acceptboard-plan-alibaba.
20. Wei & Young, supra note 15, at 5.
21. Id.
22. Telis Demos, Juro Osawa & Jacob Bunge, Alibaba: NYSE, NASDAQ Approve Partnership
Structure Proposal, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2013, 7:28 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001
424052702303672404579149981322056134.
23. Wei & Young, supra note 15, at 5.
24. Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 785 (2005).
25. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., Final Prospectus (Form 424B4) (Sept. 22, 2014) [hereinafter
Alibaba Prospectus].
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prospectus details a relationship between Alibaba and the Partnership.26 The
Partnership consists of “certain management members of [Alibaba], Small
and Micro Financial Services Company, and China Smart Logistics, [which
have] . . . the exclusive right to nominate a simple majority of the board of
directors [for the] company.”27 This structure is different from the dual-class
shareholding structure employed by companies like Google, Inc. and
Facebook, Inc., which issue two classes of shares, one of which gives
founders extensive rights and privileges above regular common
shareholders. 28 By contrast, under Alibaba’s structure, the Partnership
effectively controls the board of Alibaba, despite only owning a minority
equity stake in the company.29
Alibaba was quick to point out that, while different from Silicon Valley
tech companies, its choice of structure also differed from other Chinese
Internet companies:
Our holding company structure differs from some of our peers in that we
hold our material assets and operations, except for ICP and other licenses
for regulated activities, in our wholly foreign-owned enterprises and most
of our revenue is generated directly by the wholly-foreign owned
enterprises.30

Thus, Alibaba sought to minimize the use of the VIE structure to the greatest
extent possible. Only around 12 percent of Alibaba’s revenue is tied to the
VIE structure.31 In areas in which foreign ownership is permitted, Alibaba
conducts business through its wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs).32
Thus, Alibaba’s choice of structure provides a unique combination: a blend
of Silicon Valley-esque insider control with elements of the VIE structure
typical of the Chinese Internet sector.
Alibaba’s shares closed up 38 percent on September 19, 2014, its first
day of trading on the NYSE,33 raising $21.8 billion, equal to the total amount
26. Id.
27. Id. at cover; see also Prudence Ho & Juro Osawa, Alibaba Details Partnership Structure,

WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (Jun. 19, 2014, 12:18 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/201
4/06/19/alibaba-details-partnership-structure/.
28. See Ho & Osawa, supra note 27.
29. Fang Ying et al., Alibaba’s Stock Structure: Love It or Hate It?, CUHK CHINA BUS.
KNOWLEDGE (Nov. 21, 2014), www.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk/faculty/cbk/post.aspx?id=38D5B05E
BCF4.
30. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., Registration Statement (Form F-1) 110 (May 6, 2014)
[hereinafter Alibaba Registration Statement].
31. Leslie Picker & Zijing Wu, How Tsai Went From Yale Lacrosse Fields to Alibaba MegaDeals, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 24, 2014, 6:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-0824/how-lacrosse-playing-yalie-tsai-became-alibaba-s-mega-dealmaker.
32. See Paul Gillis, Alibaba Sets the VIE Gold Standard, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (May 7, 2014,
10:26 AM), http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/alibaba-sets-the-vie-gold.html.
33. William Alden, Alibaba’s Shares Up 38% on First Day of Trading, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
(Sept. 19, 2014, 6:32 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/19/live-blog-tracking-the-giantalibaba-i-p-o/.
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raised for all IPOs in the first half of 2015.34 Despite the successful listing on
the NYSE, the Alibaba IPO left numerous questions unanswered. For
instance, what is the legality of the VIE structure under Chinese law? Given
the ability of the Partnership to control the board of Alibaba, how can other
shareholders—even those with large equity stakes—influence corporate
governance? Will the structure impede responsive governance over the long
run? Part II of this Article will analyze the VIE corporate structure.
II. VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITY: WHAT IS THERE TO VIE
FOR?
A. WHAT IS A VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITY?
A VIE is a company that is consolidated into the financial statements of
a listing company because it is “controlled through contracts, rather than
ownership.”35 In other words, control of a company is based on contractual
arrangements, rather than owning equity in the underlying company. In the
case of a U.S-listed Chinese firm, a VIE refers to a company that is
incorporated in China and owned by individuals who are Chinese citizens,
typically its founders. The VIE, in turn, contracts with a U.S.-listed offshore
entity. Because the VIE technically meets the requirements for operating
legally in China (i.e., it is owned by Chinese citizens), it is permitted to
conduct business in industries that prohibit foreign ownership in China.36
The VIE structure allows an investor to purchase shares in an offshore
entity, typically a shell company domiciled in the Cayman Islands.37 This is
done through a series of contracts between the listed offshore entity and the
VIE in China. As such, the enforceability of this arrangement is contingent
upon the validity of the underlying contract.38
In 2000, the VIE structure emerged as a way to circumvent restrictions
on non-Chinese ownership of companies in sensitive sectors, such as energy,
the Internet, and telecommunications.39 The term originates from the U.S.
Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) Interpretation No. 46,

34. Id.
35. Paul Gillis, Variable Interest Entities in China, FORENSIC ASIA 1, 2 (Sept. 12, 2012),

http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/vie-2012septaccountingmatte.pdf.
36. Id.
37. See Understanding the VIE structure: Necessary Elements for Success and the Legal Risks
Involved, CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT 1, 2 (Aug. 10, 2011), http://cadwalader.com/uploa
ds/cfmemos/a6415b15f2ab1795be964c203f513215.pdf; Paul Gillis, Explaining VIE Structures,
CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Mar. 20, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/expl
aining-vie-structures.html.
38. See Paul Gillis & Michelle Rene Lowry, Son of Enron: Investors Weigh the Risks of Chinese
Variable Interest Entities, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 2014, at 61, 66.
39. Serena Y. Shi, Dragon’s House of Cards: Perils of Investing in Variable Interest Entities
Domiciled in the People’s Republic of China and Listed in the United States, 37 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 1256, 1267–68 (2014).
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Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities. 40 The interpretation was later
revised in 2003 and is now known as FIN46(R), which stipulates the criterion
for consolidating a VIE in financial statements.41 All foreign investment in
China, including the purchase of equities on China-based exchanges, is
subject to a government approval process that implicitly discourages foreign
investment. 42 The VIE structure provides a “creative compliance”
mechanism; the foreign-owned offshore entity is not required to undergo the
approval process. 43 While the VIE cannot operate in the restricted sector
itself, it can give foreign investors access to the revenues of the underlying
company that does.
In practice, an offshore listing company will incorporate a WFOE in
China that holds material assets and conducts material operations for the
listing company. The listing company generates revenues directly through its
ownership over the WFOEs, which directly captures the profits of the VIEs
through a series of contracts between the WFOEs and the VIEs (Figure 1).44
Within this series of contracts, a loan agreement is included that capitalizes
the VIE and sets forth its governing mechanisms.45 There may also be an
equity pledge, whereby the Chinese owner will offer collateral for the loan
agreement. VIEs and their Chinese owners will also sign a power of attorney
agreement, which grants the WFOEs the right to vote at shareholder
meetings.46 Finally, VIEs typically include a technical services agreement,
which gives the WFOE the rights to the residual profits of the VIE, which are
exchanged for services such as website maintenance, sales service, training,
and administrative support.47
Alibaba’s Chinese VIEs employ many of the classic elements of the VIE
structure. Investors in Alibaba’s shares, for instance, do not technically own
shares in the Alibaba VIEs themselves, but rather have contractual rights to
revenues of the VIEs. Jack Ma and Simon Xie are VIE equity holders for
most of Alibaba’s Chinese VIEs.48 Jack Ma and Simon Xie authorized any
person designated by the WFOEs to exercise shareholders’ rights of the VIEs,
40. See FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 46, CONSOLIDATION OF
VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITIES: AN INTERPRETATION OF ARB NO. 51 (2003), http://www.fasb.org
/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1175801627792&acceptedDisclaimer=true.
41. Id.; see also Guo Li, Chinese Style VIEs: Continuing to Sneak Under Smog?, 47 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 569, 572 (2014).
42. See Gillis & Lowry, supra note 38, at 61.
43. See Richard Pearson, Looking at Chinese VIEs, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2012, 1:39 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardpearson/2012/10/18/looking-at-chinese-vies/#45ebb408793a.
44. See Gillis & Lowry, supra note 38, at 62.
45. Id.
46. See Hai-Ching Yang, An Update on China’s Variable Interest Entities: Navigating
Regulations and Mitigating Risks for 2013, K&L GATES LEGAL INSIGHT 1, 1 (Mar. 8, 2013),
http://www.klgates.com/an-update-on-chinas-variable-interest-entities—navigating-regulationsand-mitigating-risks-for-2013-03-08-2013/.
47. See Gillis, supra note 37.
48. See Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 25, at 11, 88.
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including the right to attend and vote at the shareholders’ meeting and appoint
directors.49 As with the typical VIE structure, Alibaba’s structure provides
for a technical services agreement between the WFOEs and the VIEs, a loan
agreement, an equity pledge, a proxy agreement, and an exclusive call option
agreement.50
Figure 1: Alibaba’s Simplified VIE Structure51

B. INHERENT RISKS IN THE VIE STRUCTURE
Investing in any one of the 108 Chinese-domiciled VIEs listed on U.S.
exchanges is not without risk.52 Due to VIEs’ questionable legal status, there
may be incentives for the Chinese owner of a VIE to renege on a VIE
contract; thus exposing U.S. investors to greater corporate governance
risks.53 For example, in 2010, Giga Media Limited (Giga Media), an Asian
online gaming and services company incorporated in Singapore, operated its
gaming business through three Chinese VIEs, which held the requisite
licenses for operation and was entirely owned by Chinese nationals.54 Giga
Media fell into a dispute over the replacement of Wang Ji, the then-CEO of
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. at 91.
Id. at 90–91.
Id. at 90.
See Gillis, supra note 35, at 2 (explaining that as of September 2012, 108 out of 225 (48%)
of U.S.-listed Chinese firms adopted the VIE structure).
53. Dan Harris, Crouching Tiger, Hidden Fraud. Clear Speaking on VIEs, CHINA L. BLOG (July
16, 2011), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2011/07/crouching_tiger_hidden_fraud_clear_speaking
_on_vies.html; Li, supra note 41, at 584–91.
54. Li, supra note 41, at 585.
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its WFOE and Chinese VIE owner, who held both contractual and legal
ownership of the Chinese VIEs. 55 As a result, much of the financial and
licensing documentation regarding the Chinese VIEs suddenly went missing.
Because Giga Media, as the listing company, did not have legal ownership
over the Chinese VIEs, but simply relied upon the contractual relationships
between its WFOE and the Chinese VIE owners (including Wang Ji), Giga
Media was unable to consolidate the profits from the VIEs in that year and
ultimately was required to deconsolidate its WFOE’s financial results.56
Another famous example of the corporate governance risk inherent in
VIEs is the Alipay controversy between Alibaba and Yahoo!. In 2010,
Alibaba decided to spin-off AliPay, an online payment business developed
with Alibaba resources, to a Chinese company Zhejiang Alibaba ECommerce Co., which is owned and controlled by founder and Chairman
Jack Ma. 57 Under Alibaba’s existing VIE arrangement, there was no
obligation for the VIE company to notify foreign or minority investors of
these decisions. 58 Because there was no obligation to notify minority
shareholders, Yahoo!—which owned roughly 15.4 percent of Alibaba at the
time—missed an investment opportunity that it otherwise would have been
able to pursue. 59 Such disparate interests between VIE-empowered
shareholders (e.g., the Chinese owners who control VIEs) and minority
foreign shareholders pose great corporate governance risks for U.S. investors
of Alibaba and other companies that employ VIEs.
The heart of the issue lies in the risks of VIE agreements being declared
illegal under section (3) or (5) of Article 52 of PRC Contract Law.60 There
have been two arbitration cases by the Shanghai Sub-commission of the
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission and one
judicial decision by the People’s Supreme Court rendering the subject VIE
agreement or similar contractual arrangement void. 61 Even though the
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. KEVIN ROSIER, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SECURITY REV. COMM’N, THE RISKS

OF CHINA’S
INTERNET COMPANIES ON U.S. STOCK EXCHANGES 6–7 (2014), http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/Research/The%20Risks%20of%20China%E2%80%99s%20Internet%20Companies
%20on%20U.S.%20Stock%20Exchanges%20-%20with%20Addendum.pdf.
58. Id.
59. Id.; Allan Sloan, Yahoo’s Complex Alibaba Spin-off Deal on Wall Street Will Save Billions
in Taxes, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/yahooscomplex-alibaba-spin-off-deal-on-wall-street-will-save-billions-in-taxes/2015/01/28/8e9de498a732-11e4-a06b-9df2002b86a0_story.html (noting Yahoo!’s ownership interest in Alibaba).
60. “A contract is invalid under any of the following circumstances . . . (3) there is an attempt
to conceal illegal goals under the disguise of legitimate forms; or . . . (5) mandatory provisions of
laws and administrative regulations are violated.” Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetongfa (中华
人民共和国合同法) [Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), art. 52(3),(5) (1999),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383564.htm [hereinafter Contract
Law of China].
61. Li, supra note 41, at 592–95.
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arbitration cases are not binding on later judicial decisions and the judicial
decision by the People’s Supreme Court did not directly deal with the validity
of VIE agreements, but rather only with similar contractual arrangements, the
negative attitude towards the validity of similar agreements held by the
highest judicial institution in China clouds the future of VIE structures.62
To address the uncertainty with regard to the validity of widely adopted
VIE agreements, the Chinese government intends to regulate VIE agreements
in the 2015 Draft Foreign Investment Law. On January 19, 2015, the State
Council of the People’s Republic of China (equivalent to the U.S. Cabinet)
released draft legislation, entitled the Foreign Investment Law of the People’s
Republic of China (Draft Foreign Investment Law),63 designed to overhaul
China’s foreign investment regime. In Article 15(6), the Draft Foreign
Investment Law defines “foreign investment” to include controlling or
obtaining equity of domestic firms through contract or trust.64 In Article 18,
the Draft Foreign Investment Law further defines “control,” whereby the law
would treat a Chinese operating entity as if it were “controlled” by a foreign
entity, if the foreign entity can wield decisive influence on the management,
finance, human resource, or technology of the Chinese operating entity
through contract or trust. By the operation of these two definitions, the Draft
Foreign Investment Law regards the VIE structure as a form of foreign
investment; thus such structure would theoretically contravene the foreign
investment restrictions and be deemed illegal under this new Draft Foreign
Investment Law initiative.65
These proposed changes to Chinese foreign investment legislation will
leave existing VIEs—such as Alibaba—in a precarious state. The Draft
Foreign Investment Law essentially acknowledges that existing VIEs that are
in the restricted industries would fall into the definition of “foreign
investment” and thus are not legal under Chinese law.66 Article III.3 of the
Explanatory Note of the Draft Foreign Investment Law provides a solution

62. Id. at 595; see also Shi, supra note 39, 1294–95.
63. Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Wai Guo Tou Zi Fa (Cao An Zheng Qiu Yi Jian Gao) (

中华人民共和国外国投资法 (草案征求意见稿)) [Draft Foreign Investment Law of the People’s
Republic of China (Draft for Public Comment)] (promulgated by the Ministry of Com., Jan. 19,
2015), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/policyreleasing/201501/20150100875221
.shtml (follow “Attachment”) (last visited Feb. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Draft Foreign Investment
Law].
64. Id. art. 15; see also Hon. Mario Mancuso & Michael Gershberg, China Releases Draft
Foreign Investment Law, FRIED FRANK INT’L TRADE & INV. ALERT (Feb. 9, 2015),
http://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles%2FPublications%2FFinalv2-%20020915%20-%20FF%20In
ternational%20Trade%20and%20Investment%20Alert%20-%20China%20Releases%20Draft%20
Foreign%20Investment%20Law.pdf.
65. Draft Foreign Investment Law, supra note 63, art. 18.
66. Id. arts. 15(6), 18; see also Qiang Li et al., China’s New Foreign Investment Law,
O’MELVENY & MYERS, LLP (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.omm.com/resources/alerts-andpublications/publications/chinas-new-foreign-inv/.
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of sorts, although its implementation is uncertain. 67 VIEs operating in
restricted sectors will need to obtain permits and exemptions to comply with
new restrictions in order to continue their operations.68 Without the necessary
permits or exemptions, the VIE will be required to cease operations or face a
penalty.69
Article 149 of the Draft Foreign Investment Law proposes levying heavy
penalties on contractual schemes designed to circumvent Chinese foreign
investment restrictions.70 It is uncertain whether authorities would apply this
retroactively. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) will solicit comments
from the public on the regulation of companies employing the VIE
structure.71 This might provide large companies employing the VIE structure,
such as Alibaba, a solution whereby they either receive an exemption from
the restrictions, or are considered effectively Chinese-controlled entities.
Due to the legal uncertainty exacerbated by the newly proposed Draft
Foreign Investment Law, Chinese companies are now seeking to avoid the
VIE structure. Recently, some U.S.-listed Chinese firms, including Qihoo,
Grand Game, Perfect World, and Jiayuan, have announced plans to privatize
and relist in China because of the higher price-to-earnings ratios for
companies listed on Chinese exchanges. However, to avoid legal risks, those
firms in the foreign investment restricted industries will need to deconstruct
their VIE structures, which will be costly and time-consuming.72 Moreover,
the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology has announced
plans to release restrictions on foreign investment in the Internet sector.73 In
67. See Draft Foreign Investment Law, supra note 63, art. III.3 (follow “Notes to the Foreign
Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China”).
68. See Steve Dickinson, China VIEs are Dead. Done. Over. Stick a Fork in Them, CHINA L.
BLOG (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2015/01/china-vies-are-dead-done-overstick-a-fork-in-them.html.
69. Id.
70. Draft Foreign Investment Law, supra note 63, art. 149; see also Donald Clarke, Comments
on China’s Draft Foreign Investment Law, CHINESE LAW PROF. BLOG (Jan. 23, 2015),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/2015/01/comments-on-chinas-draft-foreig
n-investment-law.html.
71. See A Key Milestone on Administrative Regime for Foreign Investments – China’s Foreign
Investment Law (Discussion Draft), PWC: CHINA TAX & BUS. ADVISORY 1, 2 (Feb. 2015),
http://www.pwccn.com/webmedia/doc/635592458070994794_chinatax_news_feb2015_5.pdf.
72. Liu Yonggang (刘永刚), Zhong Gai Gu Xiang Hui Gui A Gu Xu Zhe Teng: Cai Jie VIE Jie
Gou Cheng Ben Gao Shi Jian Bu Ke Kong (中概股想回归 A 股需折腾：拆解 VIE 结构成本高
时间不可控) [Return to A Shares for Agonizing Want: The High Costs of Dismantling the VIE
Structure], CHINA ECON. WEEKLY (May 25, 2015), http://www.ceweekly.cn/2015/0525/112622
.shtml. Jiang Jinze (江金泽), Zhong Bang Zhong Gai Gu Hui Gui: Qi Hu Xuan Bu Shou Dao Si
You Hua Yao Yue (重磅中概股回归：奇虎宣布收到私有化要约) [Blue-Chip Chinese Firms
Returning Home: Qihoo Announced the Receipt of a Privatization Offer], WALL ST. CHINA (June
17, 2015), http://wallstreetcn.com/node/219486.
73. Guan Yu Fang Kai Zai Xian Shu Ju Chu Li Yu Jiao Yi Chu Li Ye Wu (Jing Ying Lei Dian
Zi Shang Wu) Wai Zi Gu Bi Xian Zhi De Tong Gao (关于放开在线数据处理与交易处理业务 (
经营类电子商务) 外资股比限制的通告) [Announcements Regarding Release Online Transaction
Processing and Data Processing Services (Business Class E-commerce) Foreign Equity
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that case, it is possible that the companies can keep their VIE structure while
listing on Chinese stock exchanges.74
III. THE DISPROPORTIONAL CONTROL STRUCTURE AND
ANTI-TAKEOVER PROTECTIONS
Corporate control-enhancing mechanisms are control structures or
contractual arrangements that enable certain shareholders or persons to
exercise disproportionate control rights in relation to their economic rights in
the corporations. The most commonly seen structures include multiple-class
shares, pyramids, cross-holdings, and voting agreements. 75 In the United
States, typically there are two ways to achieve disproportional control: either
creating dual-class shares, or granting a certain class or classes of shares an
enhanced or exclusive right to elect a certain number or percentage of board
members. 76 A study on S&P 1500 companies found that seventy-nine
companies (5 percent) feature dual-class share structures and/or enhanced or
exclusive board election rights.77 Such unequal voting rights arrangements
have become even more popular since 2010. Of the 170 U.S. companies that
conducted IPOs from January 1, 2010 to March 28, 2012, twenty (12 percent)
of them employed a multi-class capital structure and/or enhanced or
exclusive board election rights. 78 Unlike most other U.S.-listed Chinese
firms, Alibaba did not choose to adopt a dual-class share structure, but instead
created the Partnership and granted exclusive board nomination rights to the
Partnership.
In this Part, we will unveil the secretive Partnership and the Partnership
Committee and explore the role of the key founders in this novel governance
structure. In addition to reserving the nomination rights to the Partnership,
Alibaba also adopted several anti-takeover measures to defeat possible
challenges to the management and control rights of its key founders. We will
introduce these measures and analyze their effect on governance and
Restrictions], MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY & INFO. TECH. OF CHINA (Jun. 19, 2015),
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293832/n11293907/n11368223/16645347.html.
74. Shanghai The9 Education Technology Co., Ltd. became the first company with a VIE
structure to receive approval to list on the National Equities Exchange and Quotations (NEEQ). The
business does not belong to the industries that are restricted or prohibited from foreign investments.
See China Practice Global Vision: Legal Updates, HAN KUN LAW OFFICES (2016),
http://www.hankunlaw.com/downloadfile/newsAndInsights/da97b890df980765bab578b92b08de0
1.pdf.
75. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership
Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 498–505 (1999); Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate
Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 366 (2002); Stijn Claessens,
Simeon Djankov & Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian
Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 93 (2000).
76. IRRC INST., CONTROLLED COMPANIES IN THE STANDARD & POOR’S 1500: A TEN YEAR
PERFORMANCE AND RISK REVIEW 1, 4 (2012) [hereinafter CONTROLLED COMPANIES],
http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/FINAL-Controlled-Company-ISS-Report.pdf.
77. Id. at 3.
78. Id. at 15.
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shareholder protection. Finally, drawing on economic theories of corporate
control, we intend to provide theoretical explanations for the stunning
success of the Alibaba IPO in light of governance concerns over excessive
insider control and the associated risks of shareholder expropriation.
A. THE ALIBABA PARTNERSHIP
1. The Evolution
Alibaba’s insider partnership model is an innovative corporate
governance structure that is new to investors and regulators. However, those
well acquainted with the origins of Alibaba know that the founders have
“acted in the spirit of partnership” when they founded Alibaba in 1999.79 On
February 20, 1999, the eighteen founders of Alibaba gathered in Jack Ma’s
“Lakeside Gardens” apartment near Xi Hu (West Lake) in Hangzhou.80 The
founding capital of Alibaba was only $500,000 CNY ($76,687 USD). 81
Although Jack Ma could have personally contributed the full amount himself,
thereby becoming the sole shareholder of the new company, he instead asked
that each of the eighteen founders contribute a portion of the start-up funds
because he wanted the founding team to act in the spirit of partnership.82
People even called the partners the “Eighteen Disciples of the Buddha.”83
During the first ten years of the company’s existence, the eighteen
founders laid out the key foundation for the future growth of Alibaba.
However, after the first decade of the company’s existence, Alibaba needed
new talent to ensure continuing growth and prepare itself for its IPO.
Therefore, Jack Ma decided to formalize the Partnership to allow the
admission of new members, while at the same time preserving the culture
shaped by the founders.84 In September 2009, all of the original founders
wrote letters to Jack Ma formally resigning from their positions as
“founder[s].”85 The group resignation marked the coming of the partnership
stage of Alibaba.86

79. Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 25, at 229.
80. Wang Jingyu, Ma Yun Yi Jing Cheng Wei Zhong Guo Shou Fu Le, Dang Nian De Shi Ba

Luo Han Ne? (马云已经成为中国首富了，当年的十八罗汉呢?) [Jack Ma Has Become the
Wealthiest Person in China, But Where Are “Eighteen Disciples of the Buddha”?], 36 KR (Sept.
21, 2014, 1:50 PM), http://www.36kr.com/p/215495.html.
81. According to the exchange rate on March 29, 2016, 1 USD = 6.5078 CNY. See BLOOMBERG
BUS., http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/USDCNY:CUR (last visited March 29, 2016).
82. WEI XIN (魏昕) AND SHI HAI E (石海娥), MA YUN DI GUO ZHEN MIAN MU (馬雲帝國真
面目) [THE TRUTH ABOUT JACK MA’S EMPIRE] 94, 105 (2014).
83. Jingyu, supra note 80.
84. Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 25, at 229.
85. A Li Ba Ba Zhou Nian Qing Dian Ma Yun Yan Jiang Quan Wen Shi Lu (阿里巴巴 10 周
年庆典马云演讲全文实录) [Jack Ma’s Speech on the 10th Anniversary Ceremony of Alibaba],
TECH 163 (Sept. 11, 2009, 12:28 AM), http://tech.163.com/09/0911/00/5IT0UL13000915BF.html.
86. Id.
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In July 2010, Alibaba formalized the Partnership as Lakeside Partners
L.P.—a Cayman Islands exempted limited partnership named after the
Lakeside Gardens residential community where Jack Ma and other founders
started Alibaba in 1999.87 At the time Alibaba held its IPO in September 2014,
Alibaba disclosed in its prospectus that the Alibaba Partnership consisted of
thirty partners. 88 Among the thirty partners, twenty-four were Alibaba
managers, five were managers from Zhejiang Ant Small and Micro Financial
Services Group Co., Ltd., and one was from China Smart Logistics. 89 In
terms of the seniority of partners, seven were founders, eleven were grassroot managers who joined Alibaba before 2004, and the remaining twelve
partners were professional managers who joined Alibaba Group after 2005.90
This vast composition of members attests to the purpose of the Partnership,
which is to accommodate new talent and enhance Alibaba’s performance,
innovation, and sustainability.91 The company also points out that, “[u]nlike
dual-class ownership structures that employ a high-vote class of shares to
concentrate control in a few founders, our [partnership] approach is designed
to embody the vision of a large group of management partners.” 92 Even
though Alibaba claimed that its approach is different from dual-class shares
and that all partners have equal voting power, in reality the ultimate control
rights still lie in the hands of a few, just as in the dual-class share structure.
This is because Alibaba created another internal organization, which is higher
in the hierarchy than the Partnership―the Partnership Committee. The
Partnership Committee and the five members therein have ultimate control
over the nomination of partners comprising the Partnership, as well as the
nomination of directors of Alibaba.
2. The Partnership Committee—A Dictatorship
Within Alibaba’s corporate structure, there is a Partnership Committee
superior to the Alibaba Partnership, which controls the nomination of
partners and Partnership Committee members.93 That is to say, the ultimate
management right of Alibaba rests in the hands of five committee members—
Jack Ma, Joe Tsai, Jonathan Zhaoxi Lu, Lucy Peng, and Ming Zeng.94 Jack
Ma, Joe Tsai, and Lucy Peng were founding members in 1999.95 Jonathan
Zhaoxi Lu joined Alibaba in 2000 and succeeded Jack Ma as chief executive
87. Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 25, at 229; Alibaba Articles of Association, supra note 7,
art. 1.
88. Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 25, at 229.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 232.
91. Id. at 229.
92. Corporate Governance: Alibaba Partnership, ALIBABA GRP., http://www.alibabagroup.co
m/en/ir/governance_9 (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) [hereinafter Alibaba Corporate Governance].
93. Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 25, at 230–31.
94. Id. at 230.
95. Id. at 232.
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officer in May 2013.96 Ming Zeng joined Alibaba in 2006 and serves as the
senior vice president for corporate strategy. 97 The Partnership Committee
even reserves the right to nominate the committee members for itself.98 The
Partnership Committee members serve a term of three years and may serve
multiple terms, with elections held once every three years.99 The Partnership
Committee nominates eight partners as candidates, and each partner of the
Alibaba Partnership votes for five nominees. The five nominees who receive
the most votes are elected to the Partnership Committee. 100 Since the
Partnership Committee reserves the right to nominate its own members, the
current five members have control over their own future, along with any
future members nominated to the Partnership Committee.
The Partnership Committee also controls the nomination of new partners
to the Partnership. Although every partner can propose candidates, the
Partnership Committee determines the final list of candidates proposed to the
entire Partnership for election.101 Although election of new partners requires
the approval of at least 75 percent of all partners, a candidate would not make
it to the election without the support of the five Partnership Committee
members. 102 In other words, those five Partnership Committee members
effectively control the composition of the Partnership. However, the power
of the Partnership Committee is not without limit. Any partner can be
removed from the Partnership, including those in the Partnership Committee,
upon the vote of a simple majority of all partners for cause.103 In theory, if
certain members of the Partnership Committee violate the partnership
agreement, including failure to actively promote the corporate mission,
vision and values, committing fraud, gross misconduct or gross negligence,
the Alibaba Partnership can remove those Partnership Committee members
from the Partnership. 104 This could potentially serve as a check on the
immense power of the Partnership Committee. However, in practice, the
partners are unlikely to use their removal power against other Partnership
Committee members because the Committee has the right to nominate
partners.
According to the prospectus, the Partnership Committee has the right to
nominate director nominees to be voted on by all the partners. 105 Those
96. Id. at 236.
97. Id. at 232.
98. See id. (“Prior to each election, the partnership committee will nominate a number of

partners equal to the number of partnership committee members that will serve in the next
partnership committee term plus three additional nominees.”).
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 229. (“The partnership committee reviews the nominations and determines whether
the nomination of a candidate will be proposed to the entire partnership for election.”).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 233.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 230.
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nominees who receive the vote of a simple majority of the partners are
selected as the Partnership director nominees.106 Eventually, these nominees
will be subject to a vote by the shareholders. 107 If any nominee does not
receive a majority of votes from the shareholders at the general meeting, the
Alibaba Partnership has the right to appoint a different person to serve as an
interim director until the next annual general meeting. 108 At present,
Alibaba’s board consists of eleven members,109 four of whom are Alibaba
Partnership nominees—Jack Ma, Joe Tsai, Jonathan Zhaoxi Lu, and Daniel
Yong Zhang. 110 Among them, three are members of the Partnership
Committee, namely Jack Ma, Joe Tsai, and Jonathan Zhaoxi Lu, further
demonstrating the five Partnership Committee member’s immense control
over the the Partnership’s director nominees.111
This unique partnership-governance structure centralizes management
control of Alibaba in the five Partnership Committee members. As
mentioned, one of the checks-and-balances mechanisms that may be
employed is the removal of partners by a simple majority vote of all partners.
However, there is little chance that such removal rights will be exercised in
practice. Not just because the partners can only be removed for cause, but
also because, in addition to the nomination rights for new partners, the
Partnership Committee also controls the allocation of the annual cash bonus
pool for all partners. 112 Furthermore, partners retire from the Partnership
when they cease employment with the Alibaba business group.113 Since all
partners are executives of the company, the board has the right to remove
incompetent executives.114 Given that the Partnership Committee controls the
board, the Partnership Committee can remove any partner by ending his/her
employment relationship with the company.115 In light of this removal power,
it is unlikely that any partner would vote to remove the Partnership
Committee members, as it might jeopardize their own employment. As such,
106. Id.
107. Alibaba Articles of Association, supra note 7, art. 90 (“Director nominees shall be elected

by an Ordinary Resolution of Shareholders at each annual general meeting of the Company to fill
the seats of those Directors whose terms expire at such annual general meeting.”).
108. Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 25, at 230.
109. See Alibaba Corporate Governance, supra note 92.
110. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., Registration Statement (Form 20-F) 131 (Jun. 25, 2015)
[hereinafter 2015 Registration Statement].
111. Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 25, at 230.
112. Id. at 233.
113. Id.
114. Alibaba Articles of Association, supra note 7, art. 103 (“Subject to these Articles, the
Directors may from time to time appoint any Person, whether or not a Director, to hold such office
in the Company as the Directors may think necessary for the administration of the Company,
including but not limited to, the office of president, chief executive officer, chief financial officer,
chief operating officer, chief risk officer, chief technology officer, one or more vice-presidents,
treasurer, assistant treasurer, manager or controller . . . . Any Person so appointed by the Directors
may be removed by the Directors.”).
115. See id.
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the power of partners to remove the members of the Partnership Committee
from the position of partners is unlikely to be an effective checks-andbalances mechanism against the extreme control of the Partnership
Committee. In sum, the Partnership Committee resembles a dictatorship over
the Alibaba empire.
B. INSIDER CONTROL AND ANTI-TAKEOVER MEASURES
1. Exclusive Nomination Rights and Super-Majority Provision
According to Article 90 of the Alibaba Articles of Association, the
Partnership has the right to nominate up to a simple majority of directors on
the board, which means the Partnership controls over half of the candidates
for directors. 116 The granting of exclusive nomination rights to a specific
class of shareholders or controlling shareholders is a common control
mechanism in U.S. controlled companies and has a similar anti-takeover
effect to the dual-class share structure. 117 To ensure the Partnership’s
nomination right will endure, Alibaba also adopts another anti-takeover
provision—the super-majority provision. The Articles of Association
provides that any change to the Partnership’s nomination rights would require
the voting approval of 95 percent of all shareholders at the shareholders
meeting.118 This is an incredibly high threshold for shareholders to achieve.
The uniqueness of Alibaba’s exclusive nomination rights provision is
that the nomination right does not belong to certain shareholders, as in other
U.S. controlled companies; instead, the right is granted to a group of founders
and professional managers, who constitute the Partnership. The composition
of this group of founders and professional managers will change over time
subject to the decision of the five-member Partnership Committee.
Interestingly, the qualification for partner-status does not depend in anyway
on the shareholding of partners.119 In theory, it is possible that one day no
partners will own any shares in Alibaba, yet they may still control the board.

116. Alibaba Articles of Association, supra note 7, art. 90 (“or so long as the Partnership
Condition is satisfied, the Partnership shall have the right to nominate up to such number of persons
who shall stand for election as Directors as may be required to ensure that Directors nominated or
appointed by the Partnership shall constitute a simple majority of the total number of Directors on
the Board, with as equal a number of such nominated Directors assigned to each group of Directors
as possible.”).
117. CONTROLLED COMPANIES, supra note 76, at 4–6.
118. Alibaba Articles of Association, supra note 7, art. 1 (“Special Resolution . . . being a
resolution: (a) passed by a majority of not less than three-fourths (or, in respect of any resolution
relating to a Special Partnership Matter, or in any way having the effect of affecting a Special
Partnership Matter, including, without limitation, any amendment to the provisions of the
Memorandum or Articles which relate to a Special Partnership Matter, by 95% . . . ).”); Alibaba
Prospectus, supra note 25, at 231.
119. There is a requirement for share retention for all the partners, but there is no minimum
shareholding requirement for partners. See Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 25, at 234.
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This creates an even larger discrepancy between cash-flow rights and control
rights than in a dual-class share structure.
In fact, upon its IPO, all thirty partners held approximately 349,859,983
ordinary shares of Alibaba, which accounted for only 15.55 percent of all
outstanding shares.120 The key founders, Jack Ma and Joseph Tsai, owned 8.8
percent and 3.6 percent respectively, totaling 12.5 percent of Alibaba’s
shares.121 With only 12.5 percent of cash-flow rights, Jack Ma and Joseph
Tsai, through their control over the Partnership Committee and in turn the
Alibaba Partnership, led the nomination of a simple majority of board
members. Such a control structure resembles the type of ownership structure
called a “controlling minority structure,” where a shareholder controls a
company while holding only a fraction of shares.122 Firms with controlling
minority structures suffer from far greater agency costs than those with
dispersed-ownership structures or controlled-ownership structures.123 This is
because firms with controlling minority structures suffer from both agency
problems associated with the other two previously mentioned ownership
structures, namely: (1) divergence-of-interests agency problems, and (2)
entrenchment agency problems.124 Divergence-of-interests agency problems
arise when the controlling shareholders’ interests are not aligned with those
of noncontrolling shareholders because the controlling shareholders do not
internalize the value effects of their decisions due to low cash-flow rights.125
In this respect, Alibaba suffers from the same divergence-of-interests agency
costs found in a dispersed-ownership structure because partners of the
Alibaba Partnership hold disproportionally higher control rights than cashflow rights. Additionally, Alibaba suffers from the entrenchment agency
problem, which is associated with a controlled-ownership structure.
Alibaba’s partnership control structure insulates the firm from the threat of
mergers and acquisitions and monitoring from the market for corporate
control because outside shareholders can never control a majority of the
board, even if they obtain a majority of shareholdings. The controllers of the
firm (i.e., the Alibaba Partnership or, particularly, Jack Ma and Joseph Tsai)
are entrenched and are thus freer to extract private benefits of control than
are managers in dispersed-ownership structure firms. The dual agency
problems of Alibaba’s control structure provide the controllers with not only
120. As of June 30, 2014, there were 2,250,073,061 ordinary shares issued and outstanding. See
id. at 272.
121. Id. at 250.
122. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, CrossOwnership and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from
Cash-Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295, 295–96 (Randall K. Morck
ed., 2000).
123. Id. at 301–06.
124. See id. at 301–10; Randall Morck, Daniel Wolfenzon & Bernard Yeung, Corporate
Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth, 43 J. ECON. LITERATURE 655, 676–79 (2005).
125. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 67–70 (1991).
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the incentive, but also the power, to extract private benefits at the expense of
noncontrolling shareholders.126
2. Voting Agreement with Principle Outside Shareholders
In addition to granting the Alibaba Partnership exclusive control over
half of the board seats, Alibaba, Jack Ma, and Joe Tsai also entered into
voting agreements with Alibaba’s principle outside shareholders, Softbank
and Yahoo!, to ensure effective control over shareholders meetings (the
voting coalition). 127 Upon forming the voting coalition, the stated parties
came to three major agreements: (1) granting Softbank the right to nominate
one director, provided that Softbank maintains a holding of more than 15
percent of Alibaba common shares; (2) forming a voting coalition to support
director candidates nominated by the Alibaba Partnership and Softbank
(Softbank nominees are also subject to the condition that Softbank holds
more than 15 percent of Alibaba shares); and (3) limiting the voting power
of Softbank and Yahoo! to a certain percentage or level by granting voting
power to Jack Ma and Joe Tsai by proxy.128 At the time of Alibaba’s IPO,
Jack Ma owned 8.8 percent, Joe Tsai owned 3.6 percent, Softbank owned
34.1 percent, and Yahoo! owned 22.4 percent129—totaling 68.9 percent of
Alibaba’s shares. Even after one year, the parties still owned 57.8 percent of
Alibaba’s outstanding shares. 130 Because Alibaba adopted a majority vote
standard for the election of directors,131 and with the voting coalition (i.e.,
Jack Ma, Joe Tsai, Softbank, and Yahoo!) owning over half of the votes, the
Partnership director nominees are essentially guaranteed election.
126. Bebchuk, Kraakman & Triantis, supra note 122, at 301–06.
127. Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 25, at 255.
128. Id. at 255–56. (“SoftBank will agree (i) to vote its shares in favor of the election of the

Alibaba Partnership’s director nominees at each annual general shareholders meeting until
SoftBank’s shareholding declines below 15% of our outstanding shares and (ii) to grant the voting
power of any portion of its shareholdings exceeding 30% of our issued and outstanding ordinary
shares to Jack and Joe by proxy; Jack and Joe will vote their shares and any other shares over which
they hold voting rights in favor of the election of the SoftBank director nominee at each annual
general shareholders meeting in which the SoftBank nominee stands for election until SoftBank’s
shareholding declines below 15% of our outstanding ordinary shares; Yahoo will agree (i) to vote
its shares in favor of the election of all of the Alibaba Partnership’s director nominees and the
SoftBank director nominee, if so standing for election, at each annual general shareholders meeting
until SoftBank’s shareholding declines below 15% of our outstanding shares and (ii) to grant the
voting power over any shares it owns, up to 121.5 million of our ordinary shares, to Jack and Joe
by proxy . . . .”).
129. Id. at 250.
130. As of June 23, 2015, Jack Ma owned 7.6%, Joe Tsai owned 3.1%, Softbank owned 31.8
percent, and Yahoo! owned 15.3%, totaling 57.8%. See 2015 Registration Statement, supra note
110.
131. Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 25, at 275 (“Our articles provide that persons standing for
election as directors at a duly constituted general meeting with requisite quorum shall be elected by
an ordinary resolution of our shareholders, which requires the affirmative vote of a simple majority
of the votes cast on the resolution by the shareholders entitled to vote who are present in person or
by proxy at the meeting.”).
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3. Appointment Rights of Directors
Even if the voting rights held by the voting coalition fall under 50 percent,
Alibaba’s Articles of Association provide another layer of protection. In the
event a nominee fails to gain approval at the shareholders meeting, the
Articles of Association grant the nominating party the right to arbitrarily
appoint a different person to the board to be a director until the next annual
shareholders’ meeting, without further vote or approval by the shareholders
or the board.132 Apparently, such governance design addresses the possibility
that major shareholders might sell their shares in the future, causing the
voting coalition to collapse. As the appointment rights currently stand, the
Alibaba Partnership is essentially assured that every nominee they select will
be on the board, whether they are elected or appointed. Such appointment
rights destroy the mechanism of voting and shareholder democracy. Insiders
not only control the first stage of nomination, but also the second stage of
shareholder votes. The only difference between winning and losing the
shareholder vote lies in the tenure of the directors. If the nominees pass
shareholder votes, then the tenure is three years.133 If not, the tenure is one
year.134 Even if a Partnership nominee does not pass the shareholders’ vote,
the Alibaba Partnership can still appoint another nominee as an interim
director for one year and nominate a candidate (except for the original
nominee) for a vote at the next shareholders’ meeting. 135 Thus, such
governance design paralyzes the voting mechanism and provides insiders
uncontestable control over both the board of directors and the shareholders’
meeting.
4. Staggered Boards
In addition to exclusive nomination rights and voting agreements,
Alibaba also employs another powerful anti-takeover measure—the
staggered board. Studies have shown that staggered boards negatively
correlate with firm value and thus destroy value for shareholders. 136 In a
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 276.
Alibaba Articles of Association, supra note 7, art. 88.
Id. art. 91.
Id.
Paul A. Gompers et al. created a governance index, which includes twenty-four governance
measures that weaken shareholder rights, and proved that firms with weaker shareholder protection
have lower firm value. See Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate
Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 112 (2003). Among the twenty-four
governance measures, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell selected six measures
that entrench the board and created an entrenchment index. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen &
Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUDS. 783, 784 (2009). The
six measures include staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills,
golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. See id. at
783–85. Bebchuk et al. proved that these six measures are correlated with negative firm value, while
the other eighteen measures are not. See id. In particular, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang focus on the
effect of staggered boards and find that staggered boards are associated with statistically significant
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staggered board structure, directors are classified into groups—typically
three groups—where the tenure of each group expires in different years. As
a result, at each annual shareholders’ meeting, only one-third of the directors
will be replaced, making it harder for outsiders to gain control over the board.
The board is thus better protected against hostile takeovers and is entrenched
in power.
Alibaba’s Articles of Association stipulate that there are a total of nine
directors who are divided into three groups, designated as Group I, Group II,
and Group III.137 Group I directors—consisting of Joe Tsai, Jonathan Lu, and
Michael Evans—serve until the first annual general meeting of shareholders
after the IPO. Group II directors—consisting of Daniel Zhang, Chee Hwa
Tung, and Jerry Yang—serve until the second annual shareholders’ meeting.
Group III directors—consisting of Jack Ma, Masayoshi Son, and Walter
Kwauk—serve until the third annual shareholders’ meeting. 138 Joe Tsai,
Johnathan Lu, Daniel Zhang, and Jack Ma are the nominees of the Alibaba
Partnership, while Masayoshi Son is the nominee of Softbank. 139 The
remaining four directors are independent directors; however, Jerry Yang is
the co-founder and former CEO of Yahoo!.140
Alibaba’s governance structure not only ensures the Partnership’s control
over a majority of the board seats, but also requires that the number of
Partnership director nominees should spread as evenly as possible in each
group of directors.141 With director nominees of the Partnership occupying at
least one seat in each group, together with the appointment rights of the
Partnership in the event that the nominee fails the shareholder vote, outsiders
can only alter at most two director seats in any given year. Because the
Partnership will always control a majority of the board under the Articles of
Association, it would take outsiders at least two consecutive years to control
only a minority of board seats. Therefore, such a governance structure
effectively shields Alibaba’s incumbents from the market for corporate
control and thus exposes investors to great entrenchment and agency costs.142

reduction in firm value. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, Staggered
Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments (Harv. John M.
Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 697, 2011), http://www.law.harvard.edu/pro
grams/olin_center/papers/pdf/Bebchuk_et%20al_697.pdf; see also Lucian Bebchuk & Alma
Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409 (2005).
137. Alibaba Articles of Association, supra note 7, art. 88.
138. Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 25, at 275.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 235. However, Michael Evans was appointed as President of Alibaba on August 4,
2015, making him a management director instead of an independent director. Gillian Wong, Alibaba
Group Names Michael Evans as President, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2015, 2:01 PM), http://www.wsj.c
om/articles/alibaba-group-names-michael-evans-as-president-1438682344.
141. Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 25, at 276.
142. Bebchuk, Kraakman & Triantis, supra note 122, at 301–06.
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IV. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ALIBABA’S EXTREME
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
Alibaba’s governance structure grants disproportional control to the
founders as compared to the shareholdings owned by them. As illustrated in
the previous Subpart, such governance structure might lead to greater
entrenchment and agency costs. The question then arises as to why the
founders of Alibaba designed such a governance structure in the first place?
In theory, a firm would design an efficient governance structure in an IPO to
attract investors to subscribe IPO shares with a reasonable price. Given the
fact that investors oversubscribed to Alibaba’s IPO shares, 143 why were
investors willing to invest? Are there benefits of such a disproportional
control structure that would outweigh the associated agency costs? Existing
financial contracting and corporate control literature provide two hypotheses
regarding the effect of disproportional corporate control on shareholders’
value. First, the “entrenchment hypothesis” argues that the disproportional
control structure is value destroying because investors bear significant
agency costs from both board entrenchment, and from divergence of interests
between controlling and noncontrolling shareholders. 144 Contrary to the
entrenchment hypothesis, the “long-term value creation hypothesis” posits
that a disproportional control structure helps managers fight short-termism,
and encourages managers to pursue long-term investments and increase longterm shareholder value.145
Many policy makers have adopted the latter “long-term value creation”
view in justifying an enhanced control structure. 146 For example, France
passed the Florange Act in March 2014 to make it a default rule that
shareholders who hold shares for more than two years will be granted double
voting rights, unless two-thirds of investors dissent.147 The new law rewarded
shareholders who hold shares for more than two years with double voting
143. Liyan Chen, Ryan Mac & Brian Solomon, Alibaba Claims Title for Largest Global IPO
Ever with Extra Share Sales, FORBES (Sept. 22, 2014, 11:51 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryan
mac/2014/09/22/alibaba-claims-title-for-largest-global-ipo-ever-with-extra-share-sales/.
144. Bebchuk, Kraakman & Triantis, supra note 122, at 301–06; Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra
note 13. For a summary of empirical studies on the effect of disproportional control structure on
firm value, see Renee Adams & Daniel Ferreira, One Share-One Vote: The Empirical Evidence, 12
REV. FIN. 51, 62–65 (2008).
145. LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 63–73 (1st ed. 2012); William W. Bratton
& Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653
(2010); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1735 (2006).
146. Klaus J. Hopt, Corporate Governance in Europe: A Critical Review of the European
Commission’s Initiatives on Corporate Law and Corporate Governance 26 (Eur. Corp. Governance
Inst., Working Paper No. 296, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2644156 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139
/ssrn.2644156.
147. Shareholder Rights in Europe: Short-term or Short-changed?, THE ECONOMIST (May 2,
2015, 3:13 PM), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21650149-enhanced-rights-loyal-inves
tors-are-increasingly-touted-way-make-companies-think.
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rights to encourage long-term investments. 148 Italy followed France and
removed its prohibition on multiple voting rights in 2014.149 In 2015, the
Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) of the European Parliament proposed an
amendment proposal to the Shareholders’ Rights Directive of 2007 that
would reward long-term shareholders with extra voting rights or dividends.150
This approach was especially welcomed by state and family businesses.
Critics have commented that French reforms were led by a socialist
government in order to control state-owned enterprises with less capital, and
as a protectionist guard against foreign investors. 151 Most institutional
investors do not find double voting rights welcoming and strongly oppose the
reform.152
Current empirical evidence on the effect of disproportional control
measures is rather mixed. There are different views amongst scholars as to
the impact of disproportional insider control.153 This Article argues that there
are two forces at play: the first is the value created by concentrated control,
and the second is the value-decreasing effect of the agency costs resulting
from disproportional control. A rational investor would purchase shares in a
148. Marco Ventoruzzo, The Disappearing Taboo of Multiple Voting Shares: Regulatory
Responses to the Migration of Chrysler-Fiat 1, 8 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No.
288, 2015).
149. Id. at 13.
150. See Report of the Committee of Legal Affairs, at 33, COM (2014) 213 (May 12 , 2015),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=%2f%2fEP%2f%2fNONSGML%2bREPORT%2bA8-20150158%2b0%2bDOC%2bPDF%2bV0%2f%2fEN; Jeroen Delvoie & Carl Clottens, Accountability
and Short-Termism: Some Notes On Loyalty Shares, 9 L. & FIN. MKTS. REV. 19, 23 (2015). On July
8, 2015, the European Parliament rejected the proposal to reward long-term shareholders. See
Revision of the Shareholders Rights Directive: It’s a Long Way Home, LEXOLOGY (July 14, 2015),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=10cdafcd-9dea-43fc-9016-a96ae6952489.
151. Steve Johnson, ‘Protectionist’ French Law Alarms Investors, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2015),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5f390b20-b839-11e4-b6a5-00144feab7de.html#axzz3jbsUik88.
152. Id.
153. Some scholars find disproportional control structure to be value-destroying for shareholders.
See Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan & Larry H. P. Lang, Disentangling the
Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings, 57 J. FIN. 2741 (2002) (finding that
firm value increases with the largest shareholders’ cash-flow rights and decreases when there is a
discrepancy between voting rights and cash-flow rights); Karl V. Lins, Equity Ownership and Firm
Value in Emerging Markets, 38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 159, 170–72 (2003) (finding
that firm value is lower when insiders’ voting rights exceed cash-flow rights); Gompers, Ishii &
Metrick, supra note 13 (finding that firm value increases with insiders’ cash-flow rights and
decreases with insiders’ voting rights); Bebchuk, Kraakman & Triantis, supra note 122 (arguing
that the agency costs associated with the controlling-minority structure are greater than those
associated with either dispersed-ownership structure or controlled structure); Jesse M. Fried, The
Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 1554 (2015) (arguing that
maximizing long-term shareholder value may well destroy more value than maximizing short-term
shareholder value). Others find disproportional control increases long-term shareholder value, see
Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 541 (2015) (finding firms that grant more voting rights to long-term shareholders
outperform the market as a whole); Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and
Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560 (2016) (arguing that shareholders would benefit from
disproportional entrepreneurial control due to the idiosyncratic vision of entrepreneurs).
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company with disproportional control only when the benefits of control
outweigh the agency costs of disproportional control. These two forces are
competing and will change over time, even within a single company. This
partly explains why one sees mixed results from empirical studies. The effect
of disproportional control is dynamic, rather than static. This means different
companies at different times may experience various levels of agency costs
and benefits resulting from disproportional control. Therefore, the net effect
of disproportional control will change over time.
The application of the above concepts can help explain the myth of
Alibaba’s extreme insider control governance. As illustrated in the following
paragraphs, Jack Ma and the founding team at Alibaba have proven that they
can create great value for investors, while committing themselves to not
accruing excessive private benefits of control. By making voluntary
commitments in the prospectus, the founders put a cap on the level of private
benefits they could extract, thereby alleviating investors’ concern over the
potential expropriation risks of their wealth associated with Alibaba’s
governance structure. We argue that even though the founders
disproportionally control the firm, Alibaba successfully persuades its
investors that they can still gain value from such governance design because
other factors are present, including capped agency costs, the founding team’s
experience increasing firm value for the investors based on their past
reputation, and the high growth potential for the Chinese Internet industry.
A. VALUE CREATION BY THE FOUNDER
Any controlling shareholder who enjoys disproportionate control over a
firm can be tempted by uncontestable voting powers and is likely to abuse
such power to benefit him or herself. However, if the controlling shareholder
has a long-term vision for the company and is uniquely future-oriented,
shareholders may be better off granting the controlling shareholder absolute
control to pursue an opportunity that only they could envision. Without
absolute control, other shareholders or directors may not approve of the
controlling shareholder’s business decisions, as there is an information
asymmetry problem—other shareholders or directors may not see, or may
miss, the opportunity.154 With absolute control, the controlling shareholder is
able to realize their pursuit of idiosyncratic value and eventually increase the
firm’s value, which is thereby shared pro rata by all shareholders. 155 By
granting the controlling shareholder disproportionate control, other
shareholders are better off, as the value created by the controlling shareholder
outweighs the agency costs of expropriating private benefits of control.
A successful entrepreneur usually carries great enthusiasm for the
business he or she founds, and is more willing to devote enormous amounts
154. Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 153, at 579–81.
155. Id. at 572–74.
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of time to pursuing his or her business goal. 156 Empirical studies have
documented that founder participation matters.157 Studies have shown that
family ownership creates value only when the founder actively participates
in the business. 158 In the past, families usually adopted control-enhancing
mechanisms to exert control over their businesses when seeking outside
finance.159 In family firms with dual-class share structures, the benefits of
control outweigh the costs of disproportionate control only when the founder
actively participates in management.160 If the descendants are in charge, the
net effect of disproportionate control tends to be negative.161 This means that
the benefits the founders bring are large enough to offset the costs of
disproportionate control. As a result, these empirical studies support our
argument that Alibaba’s investors expect that they would benefit from the
participation of Alibaba’s founders by granting them disproportionate control
over the firm. 162 Jack Ma, being the spiritual leader and most reputable
founder of Alibaba, sits on the apex of the control chain by holding the
position of Partnership Committee member and continuity partner.163
Jack Ma has sought to mold Alibaba in his own image. Ma is a former
English teacher who overcame enormous obstacles to build Alibaba into the
world’s largest online retailer. 164 He has done so, however, in a quite
iconoclastic way. Ma, who claims not to understand technology, first used
the Internet in 1995, and sought to build an online marketplace to link buyers
and sellers.165 He has identified six core values for his company—customers
first, teamwork, embrace change, integrity, passion, and commitment—and

156. See, e.g., Noam Wasserman, The Founder’s Dilemma, HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 2008, at 102.
157. Belen Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How Do Family Ownership, Control and Management

Affect Firm Value?, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 385, 402–03 (2006) (finding founder-CEOs or founderchairman with a hired CEO creates the most value in family firms, as compared with descendantCEOs); Dušan Isakov & Jean-Philippe Weisskopf, Are Founding Families Special Blockholders? –
An Investigation of Controlling Shareholder Influence on Firm Performance, 41 J. BANKING & FIN.
1, 11–13 (2014) (finding that accounting performance is higher in Swiss family firms where the
founder actively participates).
158. Villalonga & Amit, supra note 157, at 402–06.
159. Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Managerial Ownership of Voting Rights, 14 J. FIN.
ECON. 33, 34 (1985); Ben Amoako-Adu & Brian F. Smith, Dual-Class Firms: Capitalization,
Ownership Structure and Recapitalization Back into Single Class, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 1083, 1096
(2001).
160. Villalonga & Amit, supra note 157, at 406–08; Isakov & Weisskopf, supra note 157, at 11–
13.
161. Villalonga & Amit, supra note 157, at 402–03.
162. Id. at 406–08.
163. As a continuity partner, there is no retirement age for Jack Ma. He can only be removed for
cause by majority vote of all partners of the Alibaba Partnership. Alibaba Prospectus, supra note
25, at 233.
164. See Steve Tobak, How Alibaba’s Jack Ma Became the Richest Man in China,
ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/237692.
165. See Michael Zakkour, How Jack Ma’s ‘Crazy’ Management Style Built a Technology
Empire, ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/237881.
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closely tied the company’s values to his own.166 He has also sought to link
his work with Alibaba with broader changes in China.167
Ma is often compared to Steve Jobs for his ability to anticipate and satisfy
market trends.168 For instance, Ma saw the huge potential for the Internet to
change commerce in China at a time when only one percent of the country’s
population was online. 169 He also foresaw the potential for an online
escrow—Alipay—to eliminate people’s hesitance to conduct transactions
online. 170 Ma now “has plans to disrupt China’s commercial banking and
insurance sectors.” 171 Given Ma’s entrepreneurial vision, his close
association with Alibaba’s values and actions, and his future commitments,
Alibaba investors can reasonably expect that the value Ma will be able to
create with stable control over Alibaba would be greater than the costs of
expropriation if he were to extract private benefits for himself.
B. CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS BY THE FOUNDER
While founders bring idiosyncratic value to the firm, rational investors
would not agree to invest if the risks of expropriation by the founders were
unforeseeable. The investment decision of a rational investor is a trade-off
between granting control and seeking protection from agency costs. If the
founders want more control, then the investors will ask for more protection
against potential expropriation. If the founders are not able to make
commitments to limit the level of expropriation, rational investors may refuse
to invest and the funding project will likely fail. This is called the
commitment problem. 172 The fiduciary rules that constrain conflicts of
interest and related party transactions are the key institutional constraint on
expropriation of private benefits of control.173 However, the effectiveness of
fiduciary rules and judicial review depend on a firm’s place of incorporation
166. Paul Jankowski, What the Core Values of Alibaba Can Teach Us, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2014,
10:19 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/pauljankowski/2014/09/30/what-the-core-values-of-aliba
ba-can-teach-us/.
167. See Maria Shao, Jack Ma: Alibaba Wants to Acquire Yahoo, INSIGHTS BY STAN. BUS. (Sept.
1, 2011), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/jack-ma-chinas-alibaba-wants-acquire-yahoo.
168. Matt Sheehan, Meet Jack Ma: The Steve Jobs of China is Just Getting Started, HUFFINGTON
POST (Jan. 23, 2015, 6:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/23/jack-ma-davos_n_653
5052.html.
169. Neil Gough & Alexandra Stephenson, The Unlikely Ascent of Jack Ma, Alibaba’s Founder,
N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/08/technology/the-unlikely-ascentof-jack-ma-alibabas-founder.html?_r=0.
170. See, e.g., Gady Epstein, Alibaba’s Ma Fights to Win Back Trust, FORBES (Apr. 11, 2011,
6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2011/0411/features-jack-ma-alibaba-e-commerce-scanda
l-face-of-china.html.
171. Bill George, Jack Ma on Alibaba, Entrepreneurs, and the Role of Handstands, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Sept. 22, 2014, 12:46 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/jack-ma-onalibaba-entrepreneurs-and-the-role-of-handstands/?_r=0.
172. Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Corporate Control and Credible Commitment, 43 INT’L
REV. L. ECON. 119, 120 (2015).
173. Id. at 120–21.
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because the law of the state of incorporation governs the internal affairs of a
company.174
In the case of Alibaba, the place of incorporation is the Cayman Islands
and the principle place of business is in China.175 Therefore, Alibaba is not
subject to the fiduciary laws of the State of Delaware, which is the
jurisdiction with which most U.S. investors are most familiar. In addition,
Alibaba has adopted the VIE structure, which further suffers from contract
enforcement risks. For Alibaba’s U.S. investors, the risk of expropriation by
the controlling shareholders is relatively high. Hence, the controlling
shareholders must make further commitments in order to persuade investors
to continue funding their project at a reasonable price. Otherwise, the firm
will likely suffer from high costs of capital with substantial discounts on the
price of shares or, even worse, may not be able to receive financing in the
capital markets at all.
In fact, as the founder and controlling shareholder of Alibaba, Jack Ma
did make commitments in the IPO prospectus to assure outside investors that
he would not accrue excessive private benefits of control, even with
disproportional control over the company. First, with regard to the most
controversial dispute over Alipay in 2011, Jack Ma transferred the ownership
of Alipay to Ant Financial Services, over which he had total control at the
time.176 This was apparently a self-dealing transaction, which would have
been subject to the procedural control and entire fairness scrutiny under
Delaware law if Alibaba were to incorporate in the state of Delaware.177 To
eliminate concerns over expropriation by Jack Ma through Alipay, Ma made
commitments in the prospectus to reduce his interest in Ant Financial
Services to a level that was commensurate with his interest in Alibaba Group
and in a manner by which he would not receive any economic benefit.178
Second, to alleviate concerns over extraction of private benefits of
control, Jack Ma committed to donate all distributions he may receive by
virtue of his 40 percent indirect interests in Yunfeng Capital to the Alibaba
Foundation, a charitable nonprofit organization. 179 Jack Ma owns a 40
174. This is the so-called “internal affairs doctrine.” See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624, 645 (1982); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 89–90 (1987); Kamen v. Kemper Fin.,
500 U.S. 90, 106 (1991); McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 216 (Del. 1987).
175. Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 25, at 10.
176. Id. at 257.
177. The business judgment rule serves as a procedural safeguard of directors’ decisions. In
Aronson, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the business judgment rule “is a presumption that
in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action was taken in the best interests of the company.” See
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). If the shareholder successfully rebuts the
presumption of the business judgment rule, then the burden of proof shifts to the directors to prove
that the transaction is entirely fair to the shareholders. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634
A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
178. Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 25, at 269.
179. Id.
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percent stake in the general partnership of funds sponsored by Yunfeng
Capital.180 Yunfeng Capital regularly enters into co-investment transactions
with the Alibaba business group, such as Youku Tudou and CITIC 21
investments. 181 These investments also constitute self-dealing transactions
between directors and the company. However, like Ma’s commitments with
respect to Alipay, his commitment to donate the distributions received from
Yunfeng Capital help to eliminate shareholders’ concerns over potential
expropriation.
Third, under the VIE structure, the variable interest entities in China will,
by contractual arrangements, transfer substantially all of the economic risks
and benefits to the WFOE in China, which is controlled by Alibaba Group
Holding Limited, the NYSE-listed company. Such structure enables U.S.
investors to share the profits of the business in China, which otherwise would
be impossible given China’s foreign investment restriction. Ma, being the
major shareholder of these variable interest entities in China, has
considerable control over the business and finance of the variable interest
entities in China.182 To address the concern over the VIE structure, Jack Ma
also committed to disclaim all economic benefits from his ownership for the
benefit of Alibaba and to enter into agreements to transfer any benefits to
Alibaba when permitted by applicable law.183
Finally, there was a concern over the control premium received by
disproportional controllers in the event of a change of control. The fear was
that these controlling shareholders would receive higher consideration for
selling their block shares, while noncontrolling shareholders would not
benefit from the controlling shareholders’ inflated share value. This control
premium was regarded as one form of a private benefit of control.184 Thus,
Alibaba’s Articles of Association prohibit partners from receiving control
premiums in the event of a change of control and require that all commonshare shareholders receive the same consideration.185
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The unique corporate ownership and control structure of U.S.-listed
Chinese firms poses a new and complex set of risks for regulators in the
180. “Jack Ma has an indirect 40% interest in . . . Yunfeng Capital, including Yunfeng Fund,
L.P., which was established in June 2010, Shanghai Yunfeng Fund, which is an RMB fund
established in May 2011, and Yunfeng Fund II, L.P., which had its final closing on May 15, 2014.
A trust established for the benefit of Jack and his family has committed US$26 million and US$4
million as a limited partner and as a general partner, respectively, to Yunfeng Fund II, L.P., which
has over US$1.0 billion in capital commitments.” Id. at 269.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 10–11.
183. Id. at 269.
184. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International
Comparison, 59 J. FIN 537, 538 (2004).
185. Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 25, at 233.

2016]

The Myth of Alibaba's Extreme Corporate Governance

467

United States. The SEC, which has administrative authority over companies
listed on U.S. exchanges, has struggled with the complexity of regulating VIE
structures involving mainly overseas operations. Below are several
regulatory proposals for mitigating the risks posed by the VIE and
disproportional insider control structures.
A. ADEQUATE DISCLOSURE OF RISKS
Due in no small part to geographic distance and different legal systems,
investors often lack the resources to complete due diligence on U.S.-listed
Chinese firms like Alibaba. The complex contractual arrangements behind a
VIE structure as well as the bewildering partnership control structure
compound this risk of misunderstanding. Full disclosure of risk is often not
forthcoming. For instance, a recent shareholder lawsuit against Alibaba and
its Partnership Committee alleged that the company failed to disclose the
rampant sale of counterfeit goods and other business practices posing legal
risk in China.186 Even with full disclosure, it would likely take a lawyer days
to fully understand the governance structure of Alibaba, let alone an
individual investor who may have no legal knowledge.
Effective regulation of companies employing the VIE structure will
necessarily require more overt explanations of the risks to shareholders.
Requiring companies who use the VIE structure to list under a name or ticker
symbol indicating its legal structure and its status under Chinese law could
help. Current regulations permit a company like Alibaba to mention
discretely in its prospectus that a partnership reserves the right to nominate
the majority of the seats on its board and in fact, in the case of Alibaba, a
five-member partnership committee controls over the partnership. 187 For
most investors, however, this level of disclosure offers an insufficient
warning of risk.
Furthermore, current securities disclosure regulations do not sufficiently
require companies to disclose weaknesses in their corporate governance
structure. Buried behind eighteen pages of risk disclosure in Alibaba’s
prospectus, including risks such as natural disasters and currency

186. See Khunt v. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., 102 F.Supp.3d 523, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
187. All foreign private issuers must submit Form F-1 to the SEC as their registration statement

under the Securities Act of 1933, which should include information under Part I of Form 20-F in
the prospectus. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Form F-1: Registration Statement Under the
Securities Act of 1933 (requiring disclosure in accordance with Form 20-F). Item 6 of Form 20-F
requires a company to disclose “any arrangement or understanding with major shareholders” with
regard to director election. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Form 20-F: Registration Form/Annual
Report/Transition Report/Shell Company Report. Item 7 requires a company to disclose “whether
the company is directly or indirectly owned or controlled by” another entity. See id.
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fluctuations, are disclosures of risks associated with the VIE structure. 188
Amongst its disclosures, Alibaba reveals its most telling risk:
If the PRC government deems that the contractual arrangements in relation
to our variable interest entities do not comply with PRC governmental
restrictions on foreign investment, or if these regulations or the
interpretation of existing regulations changes in the future, we could be
subject to penalties or be forced to relinquish our interests in those
operations.189

For a risk that could strike at the heart of a company’s operations, this is
paltry disclosure.
As more Chinese companies begin listing on U.S. exchanges, the SEC
will need to consider new ways to ensure that investors understand their
structure, whether it be a VIE or otherwise, that their risks are disclosed more
prominently and clearly, and that investors can make informed decisions
based upon an understanding of those risks.
B. PROBES ON CHINESE CASE LAW AND REGULATIONS
A fundamental part of understanding the risks associated with the VIE is
determining what Chinese law has to say regarding foreign investment in
China. Although the legality of the VIE structure is still very much
ambiguous, Chinese court opinions and regulations shed some light on the
legality of the VIE.
In 2012, China’s highest court, the Supreme People’s Court, invalidated
contracts designed to give a 6.5 percent stake in the China Minsheng Banking
Corporation Ltd. (Minsheng Bank) to Chinachem Financial Services
(Chinachem), a Hong Kong-based company. 190 In 1995, Chinachem and
China Small and Medium Enterprises Investment Co. Ltd. (SME) entered
into an entrustment agreement and a loan agreement, through which
Chinachem provided funding through the loan agreement to SME for it to
purchase shares in Mingsheng Bank and SME held shares of Minsheng Bank
on behalf of Chinachem to circumvent the foreign investment restriction in
the financial industry.191 The Court held that the agreements amounted to
“conceal[ing] illegal intentions within a lawful form,” 192 in violation of
188. Alibaba Registration Statement, supra note 30, at 39. Such risks entail anti-takeover
provisions and the aforementioned dominance of the partnership structure, which limits the ability
to nominate and elect members of the board of directors. Id.
189. Id. at 40.
190. Ming Si Zhong Zi Di 30 Hao (华懋公司与中国中小企业投资有限公司委托投资纠纷上
诉案，最高人民法院 (2002) 民四终字第 30 号终审判决) [Chinachem Fin. Servs. v. China Small
and Medium Enters. Inv. Co.] Sup. People’s Ct. (Oct. 29, 2012) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal
of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law); see also Charles C. Comey et al., China VIEs: Recent
Developments and Observations, MORRISON & FOERSTER (Aug. 15, 2013), http://media.mofo.com/
files/Uploads/Images/130716-Variable-Interest-Entities-China.pdf.
191. Li, supra note 41, at 594.
192. See Comey et al., supra note 190.
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Article 52 of PRC Contract Law.193 Despite the significant differences in the
deal structure of the agreements between Chinachem and SME and typical
VIE agreements, they both share a similar purpose of circumventing foreign
investment restriction. 194 Although the Chinachem-Minsheng case did not
directly involve a VIE structure, it did raise some red flags regarding the
validity of the VIE structure. 195 As a result, the SEC began a lengthy
correspondence with Beijing-based BAIDU Inc., China’s number one search
engine, regarding its VIE structure and recent developments under Chinese
law.196
This type of correspondence should be obligatory. In light of China’s
Draft Foreign Investment Law, the viability of the VIE structure has only
begun to be called into question. Creating a rigorous correspondence
mechanism can go a long way toward mitigating the risks associated with it.
Furthermore, the SEC must keep up-to-date with developments in Chinese
law, both legislative and case law. This can ensure that investors, and the
regulatory authorities charged with protecting them, are not one-step too late.
C. SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY AND LONG-TERM SHAREHOLDER
VALUE
Overall, empirical results tend to show that the disproportional control
structure and anti-takeover measures negatively correlate with firm value and
thus are value destroying.197 In the case of Alibaba, however, value creation
by the founders and the growth of the Chinese Internet industry might
outweigh the costs of private benefit extraction from the IPO. There is no
guarantee that Alibaba’s founders will continue to create value or that the
Chinese Internet industry will continue to grow. However, this extreme
partnership-control governance structure will nevertheless continue
indefinitely, as any change to the Partnership’s nomination rights and related
provisions would require 95 percent of shareholder votes. 198 Such a high
threshold implies that the Partnership will continue to rule the empire as long
as Alibaba remains a public company.
In the years to come, Alibaba may face succession problems, just as
family firms do. Unfortunately, evidence from family firms suggests that
193. Contract Law of China, supra note 60, art. 52(3) (A contract is invalid when “there is an
attempt to conceal illegal goals under the disguise of legitimate forms.”).
194. Li, supra note 41, at 594–95.
195. Id.
196. See Baidu, Inc., SEC Comment Letter, 2013 WL 5757152 (Oct. 18, 2013); see also Shai
Oster & Dune Lawrence, Baidu Forced to Add Warnings as Regulators Focus on China Stocks,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2013, 5:27 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-1215/baidu-forced-to-add-warnings-as-regulators-focus-on-china-stocks.
197. See Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 13; Gompers et al., supra note 136; Bebchuk &
Cohen, supra note 136; Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 136; Bebchuk, Cohen & Wang, supra
note 136.
198. Alibaba Prospectus, supra note 25, at 231.
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successors usually perform worse than founders do.199 The balance between
value creation and value destruction of corporate control will change once
the successors take over. The inflexibility of Alibaba’s governance structure
will begin to harm shareholder value once the agency costs of control begin
to outweigh the benefits. This is partly due to the controlling shareholder’s
decision to demolish the voting mechanism, which is designed to enable the
firm to adapt to different situations through constant shareholder votes.
Shareholders are the residual claimants of firm value and are most suitable to
make business decisions. Destroying the shareholder voting mechanism
might bring short-term gains to the firm, however, it risks leading to eventual
harm of long-term shareholder value.
There is no single governance model that will fit all kinds of firms in all
stages. Even within the same firm, adjustments must be made in order to
adapt to a fast-changing environment. Shareholder voting is one of the
governance mechanisms designed to keep the governance structure evolving.
Therefore, even though granting Jack Ma and the other founders excessive
control might be efficient at the time of Alibaba’s IPO, it is inefficient in the
long term because it blocks the opportunity for change by shareholder vote.
Alibaba’s 95 percent threshold is almost unachievable for public listing
companies. Thus, this super-majority provision has a de facto effect of ruling
out the possibility for change by shareholder votes. A sustainable governance
design should ensure that shareholders can pursue shareholders’ welfare and
change an inefficient governance structure through voting. Accordingly, this
Article argues that the SEC should use its discretion to reject governance
structures that require shareholders to meet an unreasonably high threshold
to amend the articles of association for public companies.
CONCLUSION
The innovative corporate ownership and control arrangements of Alibaba
pose a unique set of challenges for U.S. regulatory authorities. On the one
hand, they are a testament to the attractiveness of U.S. equity exchanges, and
provide an opportunity for American investors to participate in China’s
economic growth. On the other hand, these unique corporate governance and
control arrangements are poorly understood and thereby improperly
governed. The VIE structure carries the risk of being declared illegal under
Chinese law, which creates inherent (and potentially excessive) risk for
investors, especially those unfamiliar with the VIE. The unusual partnership
control structure, together with various anti-takeover measures adopted by
Alibaba, significantly increase the entrenchment agency costs to U.S.
investors. Crafting an effective internal and external governance mechanism
for managing such risks and allowing investors to make informed decisions
199. Villalonga & Amit, supra note 157, at 406–08; Isakov & Weisskopf, supra note 157, at 11–
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will be crucial. As more Chinese companies seek to raise capital abroad,
especially in the United States and other advanced capital markets, this
mandate will only become more important.

